Love this. It’s long past time we made sure the world of academia—a world of ideas, exploration, and learning—was free from politically-motivated intellectual policing.
Stop obfuscating the issue here with the vague principle of academic freedom.
The 1A says nothing about keeping your public teaching job. The government shall not infringe your right to speak, so, after you are fired for failing the public school mission, you can peddle your views out in the public school yard.
The taxpaying sovereign citizens can set standards and goals for teaching, require behavior and favor or disfavor scholarship. It can award or takeaway academic freedom, and define the term.
So thanks Michael Hurley, as this seems pretty good but what you're asking is a negation of the separation of state and federal, in this instance a bolstering of federal law at the state level. And which state? I mean these type of enactments, don't they create an opposing force? Such as what happened with the overturning of Roe v Wade?
Likewise, couldn't we create a bolstering law for states regarding, say, the 2nd amendment.
Regarding the requirement that a disciplinary authority state a justification for adverse action, we should bear in mind the lessons learned during the decades after SCOTUS imposed the requirement that adverse actions be restricted to opposing or punishing expression that presented a “clear and present danger.” Or look at what happens to this day with other mere labels that people think justify repression of expression (e.g., true threat, fighting words, obscenity). People always will justify repression of expression by using the labels that we say they can use.
At the very least, laws protecting expression need to emphasize the necessity to state facts showing (not mere conclusions purporting to describe) how expression/communication actually “produce[d]” or how it actually was “intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it” would “bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent” or punish. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I respect and appreciate that you have the courage to publicize the proposed text of the GUARD Act for public comment. But there's a profound and fundamental problem with this approach. It's dangerously easy to think that certain categories of people (e.g., journalists or educators) are entitled to special protection.
I think it's safe to say that most Americans (including far too many lawyers and judges) think that members of "the press" (as that term is understood today) are entitled to special protection under the First Amendment. As FIRE knows (and as SCOTUS has emphasized repeatedly), the truth is that they're not. An equally important truth is that making Americans think some people (e.g., journalists or educators) are entitled to special protection implies that the rest of us are entitled to less protection from our Constitution.
The truth is that, for the most part, we all are entitled to the same level of protection. The freedom at issue here isn't merely "academic freedom." It is the freedom of expression, communication and association that the First Amendment secures to us all. The problem here isn't merely that school administrators don't understand (or don't respect) First Amendment right and freedoms. The problem is that most Americans don't understand (or don't respect) even our freedom of expression, communication and association.
It seems to me that the problem is education. If schools taught students, faculty and administrators the source and the meaning of our First Amendment rights and freedoms, the problem of discrimination and persecution at such institutions (and elsewhere) would remedy itself to a great extent. Maybe much better education is what the GUARD Act should require.
Love this. It’s long past time we made sure the world of academia—a world of ideas, exploration, and learning—was free from politically-motivated intellectual policing.
The world of academia is itself “politically-motivated intellectual policing.”
I agree that exists in academia today (and perhaps some measure of it always has), but I don’t think it’s a defining quality of academia per se.
The professoriat is not professional or honest enough to police itself.
Stop obfuscating the issue here with the vague principle of academic freedom.
The 1A says nothing about keeping your public teaching job. The government shall not infringe your right to speak, so, after you are fired for failing the public school mission, you can peddle your views out in the public school yard.
The taxpaying sovereign citizens can set standards and goals for teaching, require behavior and favor or disfavor scholarship. It can award or takeaway academic freedom, and define the term.
So thanks Michael Hurley, as this seems pretty good but what you're asking is a negation of the separation of state and federal, in this instance a bolstering of federal law at the state level. And which state? I mean these type of enactments, don't they create an opposing force? Such as what happened with the overturning of Roe v Wade?
Likewise, couldn't we create a bolstering law for states regarding, say, the 2nd amendment.
Regarding the requirement that a disciplinary authority state a justification for adverse action, we should bear in mind the lessons learned during the decades after SCOTUS imposed the requirement that adverse actions be restricted to opposing or punishing expression that presented a “clear and present danger.” Or look at what happens to this day with other mere labels that people think justify repression of expression (e.g., true threat, fighting words, obscenity). People always will justify repression of expression by using the labels that we say they can use.
At the very least, laws protecting expression need to emphasize the necessity to state facts showing (not mere conclusions purporting to describe) how expression/communication actually “produce[d]” or how it actually was “intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it” would “bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent” or punish. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
I respect and appreciate that you have the courage to publicize the proposed text of the GUARD Act for public comment. But there's a profound and fundamental problem with this approach. It's dangerously easy to think that certain categories of people (e.g., journalists or educators) are entitled to special protection.
I think it's safe to say that most Americans (including far too many lawyers and judges) think that members of "the press" (as that term is understood today) are entitled to special protection under the First Amendment. As FIRE knows (and as SCOTUS has emphasized repeatedly), the truth is that they're not. An equally important truth is that making Americans think some people (e.g., journalists or educators) are entitled to special protection implies that the rest of us are entitled to less protection from our Constitution.
The truth is that, for the most part, we all are entitled to the same level of protection. The freedom at issue here isn't merely "academic freedom." It is the freedom of expression, communication and association that the First Amendment secures to us all. The problem here isn't merely that school administrators don't understand (or don't respect) First Amendment right and freedoms. The problem is that most Americans don't understand (or don't respect) even our freedom of expression, communication and association.
It seems to me that the problem is education. If schools taught students, faculty and administrators the source and the meaning of our First Amendment rights and freedoms, the problem of discrimination and persecution at such institutions (and elsewhere) would remedy itself to a great extent. Maybe much better education is what the GUARD Act should require.